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In an article published in
mistic picture about the future
global food security is over...
early 1982, Lester Brown painted a pessi-
of the world food situation: “The period of
the worldwide effort to expand food pro-
duction is losing momentum. .. world food supplies are tightening and the
slim margin between food production and population growth continues to
narrow.”~/ Yet later in that very year the real prices of both corn and
wheat were as low as they had been since the depth of the Great Depression,
the U.S. was idling land in an unsuccessful attempt to bring supply in
balance with demand, and stocks of grain were at near-record levels. In
1983 U.S. policy makers idled still more land by paying farmers with govern-
ment stocks to set aside still more land in the hope that in this way costly
stocks would be reduced along with government expenditures in dollar terms.
The pessimistic picture sketched out by Brown is not new. In the
mid-1970’s we were regaled with forecasts of doom as commodity prices sky-
rocketed worldwide. We heard of triage, the U.S. and other industrialized
countries were criticized for consuming too many livestock products, and
many speakers’ fees were earned advising U.S. citizens how they could help
save the world by eating one hamburger less each day.
My paper is divided in two parts. In the first I will attempt to
*presented at the meetings of the Seventh World Congress of the International
Economic Association, September 5-9, 1983.
**professor and Head, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
University of Minnesota, St. Paul.-2-
provide a brief overview of the world food situation, with an emphasis on
what has happened during the 1970’s - the decade when many observers
thought we were headed for a Malthusian crisis. In the second part I will
discuss the factors likely to affect the world food situation in the 1980’s
and beyond.
To anticipate the findings from my analysis, I will argue that the
world, and especially the less-developed countries, did a remarkable job of
dealing with their food problem during the 1970’s, despite the difficulties
of that period. Moreover, the prognosis for the decade ahead is one of
cautious optimism, with the ultimate result depending very much on how
governments deal with their agricultural sectors.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORLD FOOD SITUATION~/
The key to understanding the world food situation lies in data on (1)
production of food, (2) trends in prices of food, (3) developments in the
fertilizer industry, and (4) trade. This section contains a brief overview
of each of these topics. For reasons of space I have chosen not to enter
the debate on nutritional status, except indirectly. For a recent contri-
bution to the debate on nutritional status, see Poleman.3/
(1) Trends in Production
Selected indexes of world agricultural and food production are sum-
marized in Table 1, These data refer to the 1974-79 period, but they are
indexed to a 1961-65 base period. I have chosen to focus only on the latter
half of the 1970’s because so much of the recent debate on the food crisis
was engendered in the early 1970’s when there was a surge in international-3-
commodity prices.
The data tell an impressive story. By the end of the 1970’s agricul-
tural production for the less-developed countries as a whole has increased
an impressive 58 percent over the 1961-65 base period, compared to 42 per-
cent for the developed countries as a whole. Africa was the poor performer
among the less-developed countries, with food production having expanded
only 32 percent over this period. However, food output in East Asia had
expanded by 75 percent, and by 73 percent in Latin America and 68 percent
in West Asia. In Pakistan, food production doubled over this period, and
it almost doubled in Brazil.
Even if one takes account of the more rapid growth in population, the
performance of the less developed countries as a whole is still impressive.
The annual growth of food production per capita in the low-income countries
as a group was 0.7 percent during the 1970’s. The total masks a great
deal, however. Per capita production of food had declined by some 9 per-
cent in Africa, compared to the base period. And the increase for South
Asia, which includes some 65 percent of the population of the low-income
market economies, was only 8 percent compared to the base period. In that
region Bangladesh actually experienced a significant decline in per capita
production. Although not shown in the table, per capita production also
declined in each of the countries of the Caribbean in this same time period.
Although these data suggest a rather mixed and uneven performance on
the part of the food economy, they by no means are consistent with any
inference that we are running out of production potential, or that the
less-developed countries were unable to feed themselves. The increase in-4-
per capita production of 0.7 percent a year during the 1970’s, although
modest, was a solid achievement in light of the rapid population growth in
these countries and in light of the discriminatory economic policies which
most of these countries followed
Moreover, the performance of ind:
what might be done in the future,
was a special cause for concern.
vis-a-vis their agriculture (see below).
vidual countries lends optimism regarding
In the early 1970’s, for example, India
By the early 1980’s, however, that
country was actually exporting small surpluses of food grains.
The enigma, of course, is China, with its large population. Unfor-
tunately, the data on this country are so precarious that it is difficult
to know what to make of them. Gale Johnson has tried to disentangle them
in one of the references cited earlier.4/ Among other things, he quotes
a Chinese source which concedes that grain production per capita was about
the same in 1977 as it was in 1955. But he also cites more recent conces-
sions, which suggest that the performance of the Chinese food economy has
been anything but good.
(2) Food Prices
The price of food is another measure of scarcity. If the demand for
food was outpacing the supply, one would expect to see the relative price
of food products increasing. In fact, it was the rapid rise in commodity
prices in the early 1970’s that gave rise to the world food scare.
Figure 1 provides historical perspective on the real prices of wheat
and corn in the U.S. The price of grains is important since grains are the
primary food products of low income people. Although far more people eat
rice as a main staple than eat wheat, the price of the latter is a reasonable-5-
proxy for the price of food grains. In contrast to rice, wheat is widely
traded and is often consumed in the same countries that are major rice
consumers. The price of wheat in the U.S, is also a reasonable proxy for
the international price of wheat since the U.S. has long been an exporter
of wheat and wheat products.
The data in Figure 1 tell a revealing story. What they show, espe-
cially for wheat, is a long-term, secular decline in the real price. This
series is indexed to a 1967 base, so the prices are in terms of 1967 dollars.
If one were to draw a long term trend line through these data, the base in
the mid-1880’s would be approximately $3.50 per bushel. By the end of the
1970’s, the trend price was down to about $1.50 per bushel. This is
approximately half its price in the earlier period. Moreover, by the end of
1982, there was an even further decline in prices. This hardly suggests
that scarcity is creating a serious food problem.
These data also put the early 1970 experience in perspective. The
price “spike” of that period was obviously short-lived, with prices in real
terms quickly declining to the longer-term trend line. Moreover, the peak
of that spike did not attain even the prices realized at the end of World
War 11 when war-time scarcity created the last significant runup in commo-
dity prices.
The data also provide some insight into the nature of the hunger or
malnutrition problem. They suggest that this is an income or poverty
problem and not one of production.-6-
(3) Fertilizer
One of the concerns of the mid-1970’s was that increases in fertilizer
prices would dampen off the use of this modern input, thereby causing us to
lose not only the contribution to production of that input but also to fail
to capitalize on the increased fertilizer-responsiveness of the new high-
yielding varieties. This concern about fertilizer was due to the dramatic
rise in energy prices in the early 1970’s; nitrogen fertilizer is based
heavily on natural gas.
Fertilizer prices did increase in the first half of the 1970’s - by
140 percent in terms of prices paid by U.S. farmers from 1970 to 1975.
However, a longer-term perspective shows that the relative price of ferti-
lizer rose only modestly. Table 2 presents indexes of prices paid by U.S.
farmers for all production items and for individual components of the input
mix. Compared to 1970, fertilizer prices at mid-1982 had increased less
than 10 percent more than all
table shows that this pattern
production items. The bottom half of the
was similar in the European Community.
This failure of fertilizer prices to rise as much as energy prices is
explained in part by the fact that, important as natural gas is for the
production of nitrogen fertilizer, the production process is still capital
intensive. Hence the effect of energy prices alone was less than many
observers expected. In addition, it appears that there was substantial
growth in productivity in the fertilizer industry.
What can we expect in the future? the OPEC appears to be losing its
ability to unilaterally mandate high energy prices. It is very possible
that we could see a steady decline in real fertilizer prices again, much as-7-
we saw in the 1950’s and 1960’s. This shift will come about in part due to
the relocation of the world’s fertilizer industry to parts of the world
where natural gas is being flared off. Fertilizer is now a widely traded
product.
(4) Trade in Agricultural Products
It was widely expected at the time of the world food crisis in the mid-
1970’s that the low income developing countries would put inordinate demands
on world food supplies due to their inability to feed their rapidly growing
population. This is not what happened.
Data are presented in Table 3 on international trade in cereals by
economic groups from 1960 through 1980. Between 1969-71 and 1980 world
grain imports increased by 118 million tons for more than a doubling of
total imports. The centrally planned economies and the middle income
market economies accounted for almost all of this increase, with the cen-
trally planned economies accounting for the larger share (56 million tons
versus 37 million tons). These two groups together accounted for more than
half the world’s population (1,321 million and 933 million in mid-1978).
The low-income countries increased their imports only moderately over
the decade. The same applies to the industrial economies, whose imports
increased by only 22 million tons over the decade, or less than a fifth of
the total increase in grain imports. Instead, the industrial economies
increased both their gross and net exports by a
the U.S. alone accounting for almost 70 percent
grain exports for the decade.
substantial amount, with
of the total increase in-8-
The increased imports by the centrally planned economies reflected a
number of factors. Bad weather has been the conventional explanation for
the Soviet Union although it is increasingly recognized that mismanagement
of the agricultural sector has been an important factor. Holding the nomi-
nal prices of livestock products constant for the past two decades has
compounded the problem.
In looking to the future it is very likely that the Soviet Union will
remain a major grain importer, unless there should be a major change in the
economic regime. Imports by Eastern European countries have recently
declined from their peak level of 1979-80 (from 17.5 million tons to 14
million tons). The problem in this case has been the lack of foreign
exchange.
China is the big enigma among the centrally planned economies, and in
the global context as well. We really understand only poorly what is going
on in that country. Agricultural trade optimists see China as an enormous
potential market for the future. The problem, however, will be foreign
exchange. China’s export capacity for other products would have to grow
significantly if it were to have the foreign exchange needed to become a
major grain importer. Moreover, other countries would have to be willing to
accept those exports. Although somewhat equivocal, Gale Johnson judges that
Chinese imports could remain at about the present level of 15 million tons
a year.~1 That is probably as good a guess as any.
Lesser developed, middle income countries will probably continue to be
strong importers in the decade ahead. How strong the demand from these
countries will be will depend on how strongly the international economy-9-
recovers and how broadly economic development spreads among the less
developed countries. John Mellor expects the input demand from these
countries to grow very rapidly in the decade ahead.~/ As I will argue
below, in my judgment this will depend very much on government policies,
and these are difficult to predict.
To conclude this section, a few remarks on the role of the United
States in this system are in order. The large export boom of the 1970’s
was in large part induced by a decline in the real exchange rate of the
U.S. dollar. In the beginning this decline was a connection of the over-
valuation of the dollar that had prevailed during the 1950’s and 1960’s,~/
but which became more severe in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. However,
during most of the 1970’s the dollar was weak in large part because as a
nation we were subsidizing petroleum imports at the very time that OPEC
was imposing large increases in petroleum prices.
President Reagan’s deregulation of the petroleum industry, plus a
renewal of the U.S. acting as central banker for the world, has changed all
that. The U.S. dollar has risen something like 25 percent in real terms
over the last two years. That has choked off the U.S. export boom,~/ with
value of exports having declined over 20 percent from its peak in 1981 to
marketing year 1983. If OPEC should in fact break up and petroleum prices
continue to decline, we could see a continuation of that trend. Export
supplies of grain will come in the future from a more diversified set of
countries.-1o-
11. PROGNOSIS FOR THE DECADE AHEAD
The outlook for the world food situation is one of mild optimism. In
my judgment we will continue to do an increasingly better job of feeding
the world’s population, although not all malnutrition or famine will be eli-
minated in the decades ahead. Whether my judgment proves to be correct,
however, will depend very much on continuation of some policies now in
place and further improvement in other policies. In this section I will
attempt to explain why I am cautiously optimistic about the decade ahead.
(1) Investments in Agricultural Research
Pessimists about the world food situation predicate their arguments in
large part on the fact that output expansion of the past has been largely
due to increases in the land under cultivation and judgments that there is
little or no additional land to bring into cultivation, at least in some
parts of the world.
One could argue long and hard over how much additional land could be
brought into cultivation. Obviously this will vary a great deal from one
part of the world to another. But that argument is in my judgment largely
beside the point. As Professor Schultz,~/ Hayami and Ruttan,10/ and others —
have long argued, a modern agriculture is based in large part on science
and technology and the production of
It is not based on land.
The lesson provided by the U.S.
modern imports in the industrial sector.
experience makes this point quite
forcefully. It is difficult to understand why observers of the world food
scene have found the lesson so difficult to learn. From roughly the mid-
1920’s through the mid-1970’s there was no increase in the total stock of-11-
imports in U.S. agriculture (Table 4). All the increase in production in
that period - and at times the increase was so large that a variety of pro-
grams were used to reduce import use, store the surplus, and give it away -
were due to increases in productivity. It is time that the import mix
changed dramatically over that period (Table 4). But total land use over
that period was actually lower at the end of the period than it was at the
beginning.
Total import use has increased since the mid-1970’s by about 8 percent.
But that is due in large part to the major realignment of the real exchange
rate. With the dollar back up to its pre-1973 levels again, we can expect
to see these resources squeezed out of the sector - painful as that process
will be.
An important source of the increase in productivity over this period
was due to the investments in agricultural research and development and to
the education of the rural population.11/ One of the encouraging things —
about the world food scene is that other countries - and especially the
less-developed countries - have discovered this route to investment and
have belatedly begun to invest in agricultural R and D.
Table 5 summarizes data collected by Bob Evenson which indicate how
expenditures on agricultural research have increased since 1959. For the
world as a whole, expenditures increased by 180 percent in real terms from
1959 to 1971. Although the growth rate leveled off during the 1970’s, an
increase of 25 percent in real terms - which is what happened from 1971 to
1980 - is still substantial.-12-
The performance of the less-developed countries is even more impressive.
Expenditures by countries in these three regions increased 4.6-fold from
1959 to 1971, and by another 39 percent by 1980. Even granting that the
initial increase was on a small base, the increase is still very significant.
In addition to these direct investments by individual countries, an
international system of Agricultural Research Centers has evolved since the
late 1960’s. Supported primarily by international donor




With both the International Agricultural Research Centers and the
expenditures by less-developed countries it is important to recognize that
most of the payoff from these increased expenditures is still to be
realized. It takes from 7-10 years from the time expenditures start on a
research program until increases in productivity begin to show up at the
farm level. The 1970’s were devoted to establishing the international
system. Moreover, many of the less-developed countries had to train staff
and organize their own research program as well. Everything we know about
the research process would indicate that an augmented flow of new produc-
tion technology will be forthcoming from these past expenditures.
(2) Price Policies and Social Profitability
The last five years have seen a rediscovery of price policy and incen-
tives as an important component of agricultural development policy.12/ It —
is increasingly recognized that most governments intervene vis-a-vis their
agricultural sector. Moreover, there is an important dichotomy between
the less developed countries and the industrialized countries of the West-13-
in how they intervene. The latter tend to set domestic prices above inter-
national opportunity cost levels. The former tend to set agricultural
prices below their international opportunity cost levels.
Two aspects of agricultural price policy have not in my judgment
received the attention they deserve. The first is the extent to which
trade and exchange rate policies have been the main instruments by which
governments have intervened and the extent to which they have played a
major role in shifting the domestic terms of trade against agriculture.
The second is the general failure to examine the social profitability of
agriculture in a general equilibrium framework as the basis for evaluating
policies affecting agriculture.
The failure to address the effects of trade and exchange rate policy
on the domestic terms of trade is somewhat ironic in light of the importance
the less developed countries have attached to the external terms of trade.
At the very time these countries issue complaints about declining external
terms of trade and lack of export opportunities, these same countries have
in many cases severely overvalued their currency in foreign exchange
markets, imposed explicit export taxes, limited exports, and imposed
complicated export licensing provisions to limit exports. The net effect
of these policies is to divert agricultural
markets and to the domestic market. To put
external markets have in important respects
output away from visible export
it succinctly, limitations on
been self-imposed. Moreover,
domestic prices of agricultural products have been less than they otherwise
would have been as a consequence of these policies.-14-
Parallel to these export restricting policies, high levels of effective
protection have been provided for the industrial sector. The combination of
discriminatory policies against agriculture and high levels of effective
protection for the industrial sector has caused in many countries a dramatic
shift in the domestic terms of trade against agriculture. Unfortunately,
analysts dealing with agriculture have all too often taken a sectoral
approach to the problem. They examine the ratio of agricultural product
and import prices and make inferences about whether policy is discriminatory
or not. To do the analysis properly, however, the domestic terms of trade
have to be considered if one wants to have any insights about the relative
social profitability of agriculture. And it is the relative social profit-
ability of the sector which determines whether investment funds flow into
or out of the sector.
Table 6 provides data on Egyptian agriculture which provide insights
into the degree of distortion that often occurs. A naive interpretation of
these data would focus on a comparison of prices paid to farmers with border
prices evaluated at the official exchange rate. Even that comparison shows
a significant discrimination against agricultural producers. But it tells
only part of the story. For example, overvaluation of the currency amounts
to an implicit export tax. As the data in the table illustrate, if an
equilibrium exchange rate is used to evaluate the border prices, the degree
of discrimination is even more severe. Moreover, if one recognizes that,
whereas agricultural prices are distorted below their border price oppor-
tunity costs, industrial prices are set above them - and in the case of
Egypt by about 25 percent - one begins to see the degree of policy-15-
discrimination against agriculture.13/ —
Unfortunately, this is not an unusual case. Overvaluing one’s cur-
rency has probably been the single most common policy distortion among
less-developed countries. And the degree of overvaluation is not small.
The implicit export tax from the overvaluation of the currency alone in
Brazil, for example, ranged from 22 to 37 percent between 1954 and 1966.14/ —
In an earlier three-year period the implicit export tax due to the over-
valued currency was 48 and 49 percent in the three year period 1952-54.15/ —
The recent float of the Mexican peso provides another example of how over-
valued currencies often are. It is little wonder the agriculture of these
countries does so poorly. It is also little wonder that countries imposing
such distortions shift from being a net exporter of food to being a net
importer. After all, the over-valued currency is an implicit import sub-
sidy as well as an implicit export tax.
A proper way to measure the distortion in social profitability of
agriculture is by means of effective protection. Case after case of such
studies shows the effective protection of the industrial sector to range
from, say, 25 percent up to 100 percent or more,16/ while the effective —
protection of agriculture is negative - and by large amounts in some cases.
To summarize, trade and exchange rate policies have undervalued agri-
cultural resources by very significant amounts in country after country.
These same policies have caused many low-income countries to shift from
being net exporters to being net importers of agricultural products. It is
not that these countries can’t do a better job of feeding themselves. It’s
that their policies make agriculture a very unprofitable activity, and-16-
eventually channel resources to other sectors of the economy where profit-
ability is greater.
The important point, of course, is that changing these policies can
change the output mix of the economy. And that is what gives rise to
cautious optimism about our ability to deal with the world food problem.
Somewhat paradoxically, the present crisis in international financial mar-
kets may be the harbinger of a brighter future for agriculture in many
countries experiencing such crises. Policy makers will be forced to realign
their exchange rates to bring their external accounts in line in order to
pay off their debts. These realignments will reduce the discrimination
against agriculture. They will also reduce the import subsidies that have
caused imports of food to grow so rapidly in some countries.
(3) Soil Eros,ion
The latest cause celebre of those who expect a
ahead is soil erosion. This has become a big issue





There is little doubt that in some countries and in some areas of
individual countries there are serious problems of erosion. No one who has
visited the hill country of India, for example, can come away insensitive
to the problem. However, some of the polemies about soil erosion appear to
be a throw-back to an earlier day when it was assumed that farmers are
stupid - that they don’t know how to husband their resources. All the
evidence we have suggests that farmers are not stupid, despite the procli-
vity of urban intellectuals to assume they are. Hence, there seems little
reason to assume that farmers will not protect their basic resource base by-17-
proper management.
Having said that, there is an important way in which misguided policy
can lead to more erosion than would otherwise be the case. The policies
described above, which severely undervalue agricultural resources, obviously
reduce the incentives to protect and to invest in agricultural land.
Moreover, there is some evidence that the incidence of the implicit export
taxes and other policies which discriminate aginst agriculture is on the
small producer.17/ But the incidence is skewed in this direction in large —
part because small producers tend to face imperfect product and factor
markets. The solution to this problem is to reduce the degree of discrimi-
nation against agriculture and to make the markets more perfect.
In the case of the U.S., Bill Larson, a distinguished soil scientist at
the University of Minnesota has recently carefully assembled data which
suggests that serious soil erosion is a problem on no more than 8-10 per-
cent of our available land.18/ Moreover, his data show that the share —
land which is subject to serious erosion has declined over the years.
of
To conclude, my purpose is
merit our attention as a policy
economic basis for much of this
not to argue that soil erosion does not
issue. It is, instead, to argue that the
erosion is rooted in the same policies that
have discriminated so severely against agriculture. Changing those policies
can provide much stronger incentives for farmers to husband their soil
resources and to invest in them just as they would their other resources.
(4) Water
The adoption of improved seed and modern inputs such as fertilizer has
increased the demand for water and caused many to question the adequacy of-18-
of supply of this critical input in the future. And in fact many less-
developed countries such as India have invested heavily in developing
irrigation systems to provide larger supplies of water for agriculture.
The concern about water as a constraint on expansion of food output
derives in large part from perceived wastage of water under rather wide
socio-economic conditions. And there is wastage, tracing in large part to
the failure to establish effective pricing systems for management and
allocation of water. The use of proper pricing policies will help reduce
this wastage and assure adequate supplies for years to come.
(5) Trade
Trade in agricultural products has provided increasing supplies of
food to many countries over this past decade, especially to the less-
developed countries and the centrally planned economies. The United States
provided a major share of this increase in exports.
We may see rather major shifts in trade flows and in their role in
feeding the world’s population. In the first place, the augmented flow of
new production technology can very well change the pattern of competitive
advantage on the world scene. In fact, we may well see some major shifts
in production patterns.
Second, the U.S. may well decline in relative importance as a supplier
of food in the next decade. The U.S. export boom of the last decade was
driven in large part by a very weak dollar , which in turn was a byproduct
of the energy crisis and misguided energy policies in this country. The
dollar is now strong, and in part because as a nation we are no longer
subsidizing petroleum imports. There is no obvious reason to expect the-19-
value of the dollar to experience another major decline in the years ahead.
Consequently, our exports are likely to stagnate in the years ahead and we
will become relatively less important in world markets.
Similarly, if the less developed countries alter their policies as I
expect, there will be less subsidization of food imports in the decade
ahead. In fact, many countries that are now net importers may well become
net exporters.
These developments do not necessarily mean that trade in the aggregate
will decline. It does suggest that the character and directions of this
trade may well change, however. The centrally-planned economies are likely
to continue to be major importers, as will the low-income countries that
experience significant economic development. Consequently, the flow of
agricultural trade will likely become more diversified and the markets are
likely to become a great deal more competitive.
III. Concluding Comments
The world food economy has become increasingly internationalized, with
individual countries linked together in a reasonably effective world food
system. This system is heavily distorted with a wide range of government
interventions designed to give particular economies an advantage in inter-
national markets and to deal with domestic policy objectives. The challenge
in the decade ahead will be to reduce and alter these distortions so that
market forces can work and the world’s agricultural resources can be used
more efficiently. If we should be reasonably successful in reducing those
distortions we have an excellent chance to make progress in dealing with-20-
the world food problem is an effective way.19/ In fact, it is very likely” —
that the challenge of the decade ahead will be to deal with serious adjust-
ment problems in world agriculture, not with a problem of inadequate food
production.-21-
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December, 1982. (Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
University of Minnesota, St. Paul.)-23-
.-24-
TABLE 2
FARM INPUT PRICES, THE UNITED STATES
(1970 = 100)
AND THE EUROPEAN CO@ITY
Mid-
1973 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981 1982
United States
All Production Items 135 169 185 231 256 274 278
Fertilizer 117 250 208 225 279 300 304







110 169 192 263 362 410 384
159 185 185 203 228 248 235
Used
130 169 211 234 257 291 --
120 198 211 243 286 332 --
Energy and Lubricants 123 194 245 306 376 454 --
Feeding Stuffs 134 156 204 215 228 258 --
Sources: United States: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
Prices, various issues. European Community: Commission of the European Com-
munities, The Agricultural Situation in the Community, annual reports for
1976, 1980 and 1981.
based
Note:
%ata are for the Nine members except that 1981 price indexes were
on differences between 1981 and 1980 prices for the Ten members.





































Indexes of Total Farm Input and Major Input Subgroups,
United States, 1924-26 and 1974-76
(1967 = 100)
1924-26 1974-76
Total Input 100 101
Farm Labor 337 76
Farm Real Estate 100 96
Mechanical Power & Machinery 33 113
Agricultural Chemicals 8 137
Feed, Seed & Livestock Producers 32 106
Taxes and Interest 69 101
Miscellaneous 87 109
Source: Economic Research Service, Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector:
Production and Efficiency Statistics, 1980, Statistical Bulletin
No. 679, U.S. Department of Agriculture.-27-
Table 5
Research Expenditures by Region, 1959-80
(000 Constant 1980 U.S.$)
1959 1971 1980
North America & Oceania 760,466 1,619,404 1,722,390
Western Europe 274,984 971,704 1,489,588
Eastern Europe & U.S.S.R. 568,284 1,360,196 1,492,783
Latin America 79,556 237,088 462,631
Africa 12,740 55,615 75,156
Asia 261,114 1,339,769 1,734,535
TOTAL 1,957,144 5,583,776 6,977,113
Source: Summary tables from Bob Emerson-28-
Table 6
Price Structure for Selected Agricultural Products
(1980 in L.E. per metric tons)






























Source: USAID Mission, “CDSS Policy Issues Facing Egypt,” USAID/Cairo,
February 1982.
l/Market exchange rate: L.E. .84 = U.S. $1; official exchange rate:
L.E. .70 = U.S. $1.-.7-g-
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